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LECTURE Two: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE MESS
Tonight's lecture is entitled The Establishment Clause Mess.
Before I get into it too deeply, I would like to sketch out two dis-
tinctions: one descriptive, one normative. The descriptive point
that I would like to make is that to call the establishment clause a
mess-as I believe that it is-is to make an analytical claim. My
intention is to criticize establishment clause jurisprudence, and you
will hear me do so. But that is not the same as saying that no estab-
lishment clause is needed. The distinction is between referring, on
the one hand, to an establishment clause, the theoretical argument
for a form of separation of church and state, and, on the other hand,
to The Establishment Clause, capital T, which is shorthand for the
particular doctrinal baggage with which our establishment clause
has been saddled. That is my descriptive distinction.
The normative distinction that I want to draw is really by way of
laying out my own interpretive position. I am quite certain that the
first amendment's establishment clause should be read at a mini-
mum to prohibit certain entanglements between government and
religion (it is unnecessary at this point to specify which) and, in
particular, that the clause outlaws efforts by government to coerce
religious belief. 1 That explains, for example, why the Supreme
• Professor of Law, Yale University.
I For a broader statement of this thesis, not all of which I necessarily accept, see
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
933 (1986).
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Court's decisions forbidding public schools to conduct organized
classroom prayer led by a teacher2 are plainly right, even though
most Americans continue to oppose them. 3 But to say that an es-
tablishment clause is necessary is not the same as saying that the
one we have-that is, the one that the federal courts have given
us-is the one that we need. I shall argue tonight that it is not.
The link between last night's lecture and tonight's has to do with
the epistemology of liberal constitutionalism. I ended last night's
lecture with a question regarding the refusal of Jehovah's Witnesses
to accept blood transfusions. The Witnesses, you will recall, believe
that accepting a transfusion is contrary to God's will, and, in partic-
ular, that it violates the Old Testament injunction against eating
human flesh. Eating human flesh, say the Witnesses, even if the act
is unwilling, will lead to perdition. The courts, I noted, will rou-
tinely order a transfusion for a Witness who is unconscious or who
is a minor when, in the opinion of medical personnel, the Witness
will die without the transfusion. The question with which I ended
is this one: Is the statement "If I am transfused, God will refuse me
eternal salvation" a statement of fact or a statement of a value?
The answer, of course, depends on where you happen to be stand-
ing. To the Witness, the statement is factual; it may even be verifia-
ble. But liberal theory, because of its relentlessly materialist focus,
cannot consider the statement factual. And in that simple conflict
lies much that is wrong with the way our constitutional jurispru-
dence resolves conflicts between law and religion in general, but sci-
entism and religion in particular.
A. Empirical Morality and Religious Morality
Contemporary liberalism, as I explained last night, rests centrally
on the proposition that the boundary between facts and values is
relatively clear and reliable. The liberal state is supposed to be neu-
tral as between competing conceptions of good. And liberal law in
general, but liberal constitutionalism in particular, needs a
fact/value distinction because the liberal judge is not supposed to
enforce her own values. Rather, the judge is supposed to enforce
public values, as enacted in law, on a particular set of facts.
I further argued last night that liberal legal dialogue is tilted to-
2 See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
3 See, e.g., THE GALLUP REPORT No. 217, at 17-19 (Oct. 1983) (strong majority in
favor of constitutional amendment to allow voluntary classroom prayer).
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ward empirical morality, that is, toward moral propositions that can
be stated in ways that imply testable factual propositions. I hinted
toward the end of that first lecture that the preference for empirical
morality entails a suspicion toward epistemological positions mark-
edly different from what one might think of as materialistic empiri-
cism. What I mean is that liberal law is by necessity suspicious of
epistemologies that generate statements styled as facts but not read-
ily testable by materialistic means.
Think for a moment of what used to be called miracles, until
Hume told us not to trust them, and what are now considered su-
pernatural stories believed only by the superstitious. Even today,
many religious faiths are centered on miracles and mysteries
(although to be sure, except perhaps for Barth, twentieth century
Christian theology has been largely a march away from both). But
no matter how widespread the belief in the truth of any particular
miracle might be, post-Enlightenment dialogue does not admit any
serious possibility that the miracle is true. Nor is that position lim-
ited to philosophers of religion or ethicists. Were I to tell you now,
from this lectern, of a dream in which I received a revelation from
God, and of a miraculous event that accompanied it, most of you
would no doubt cease to think of me as a scholar and dismiss me as
a superstitious fanatic.
There is a point to this. Jeffrey Stout, in the book that I men-
tioned last night, quotes a bit of Tom Stoppard by way of discussing
the role of religion in society after the Enlightenment. According to
a character in one of Stoppard's plays, there came "a calendar
date-a moment-when the onus of proof passed from the atheist
to the believer, when, quite suddenly, the noes had it."4
Now, let's think about that quotation for a moment. Suddenly,
says Stoppard, the noes had it. Is he right? Do the noes have it?
Nietzsche, you will remember, thought God was dead, that philoso-
phy and perhaps experience had destroyed divine authority. And
when one looks at contemporary liberal dialogue in general, and
liberal constitutional dialogue in particular, one cannot help think-
ing that Stoppard-as interpreted by Stout-has a point, at least
about epistemology. Faith-based epistemologies are not merely sus-
pect when offered in public debate; they are practically outlaws. So
perhaps the noes really do have it.
Recall for a moment our discussion last night of the recent furor
4 J. STOUT. THE FLIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION. MORALITY AND THE
QUEST FOR AUTONOMY 150 (1981) (quoting T. STOPPARD, JUMPERS).
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over the Ayatollah Khomeini's death sentence of author Salman
Rushdie for what was described as an act of blasphemy. The princi-
pal problem, from the liberal standpoint, was not the death sentence
itself; for lots of people are sentenced to death, sometimes by liberal
political communities. So what was the problem with the Ayatol-
lah's act? A number of commentators seemed to think that the
problem was a religious fanatic sentencing a writer to death on the
basis of a book, so the critics kept reminding us, that he had not
even read. Well, the critics were right to condemn the Ayatollah
for sentencing Rushdie to death for views expressed in a book; it is
unacceptable behavior. But what possible difference can it make
whether the reasons for the sentence were religious or not and
whether the Ayatollah had read the book or not? Had the Ayatol-
lah read the book and issued the death sentence because he was
personally insulted, would the moral question have been different?
Suppose the Ayatollah had decided to kill Rushdie not for religious
reasons but because the book indicated that Rushdie was a threat to
his nation's security?
I would suggest that in our dominant liberal dialogue, these last
two possibilities would indeed stand on a different footing, because,
whatever the Ayatollah might be up to, he would not be acting as a
religious leader. After all, as I pointed out last night, people around
the world die for their political views every day and not all of them
become media heroes because of it. No, the religious component of
the Ayatollah's justification-in short, the epistemology-is an es-
sential part of the liberal story of the horror confronting Rushdie.
To punish someone for his or her views is illiberal and deserving of
condemnation. But apparently deserving of more condemnation
when the punisher acts on religious grounds than when the pun-
isher acts on commonly accepted political grounds. Only a fanatic
would use God's will rather than man's politics as a justification for
murder. In short, the noes have it.
It is not my intention, obviously, to defend the Ayatollah; I am
only questioning the rhetoric of some of the critics. I feel much the
same way about the criticism that emphasizes the religious aspect of
the sentence on Rushdie as I do about the opposition to the teach-
ing of scientific creationism on the ground that it is a religious
teaching. I take the critics of the religious aspects of creationism to
mean that most, maybe all, adherents of creationism reached their
views through a world view that holds particular aspects of God's
word unchallengeable (in this case, the account of creation set forth
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in the opening chapters of Genesis). Again, please note that the
attack is epistemological; the claim is that the creationists are using
the wrong methodology to learn facts about the world.
If you think back to last night's example of the Circular Area
Bill, the problem was not epistemology but error; the legislators just
messed up. But creationists have done more than just mess up. The
principal plaint against their science is not that it is in error but that
it is not really science; and, the reason that it is not really science is
epistemological. Creationism, say the critics, to the extent that it is
analytical at all, generates few if any hypotheses that are testable in
the natural world. Creationism, in short, lacks a materialist theory.
But this is scarcely surprising, the critics continue, because crea-
tionism does not rest on observations in the natural world but on an
interpretation of a sacred text. 5 The relative sophistication of that
interpretation is, for most critics, hardly the point. (Some critics
dismiss it casually as "literalism," as though no non-fanatic could
ever take a religious text literally). But what really matters to the
critic is what is being interpreted. To rely for one's world view on
the book of scripture rather than the book of nature isn't simply
unscientific, it is actually illiberal. And in the liberal account, it
leads to a morality that is fanatical rather than empirical, because
its adherents are unlikely to change their views based on what lib-
eral theory is accustomed to calling "facts." A religiously based
proposition, in the liberal account, is by definition not a fact. It is
simply a metaphysical belief, and not a belief to be taken seriously
by any person of true learning. So here, once again, the noes have
it.
The uneasy truth, but one that we all must face, is that liberalism
routinely bars people whose moral judgments have religious roots
from public moral debates. They are kept at bay with epithets-
"fanatic" once more comes to mind-as well as with more sophisti-
cated charges, such as the claim that they are trying to impose their
narrow sectarian beliefs. Most other sources of moral understand-
ing seem to be legitimate in the public dialogue that liberalism de-
mands-but not religion. Quite apart from the first amendment,
religious morality is trivialized, insulted, ignored. The noes have it.
5 Creationists deny that their science has no basis in observations about the natural
world. One of the most widely misunderstood or mischaracterized aspects of Christian
fundamentalism is its strong tradition of insisting on reason as the path to both religious
and factual knowledge. For an interesting discussion of this characteristic, and of public
ignorance of it, see H. Cox, RELIGION IN THE SECULAR CITY: TOWARD A
POSTMOOERN THEOLOGY 72-82 (1984).
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Or do they? I mentioned that Stout quotes Stoppard. I didn't
mention what Stout says about the quote. and I would like to do so
now. "If so." says Stout. meaning if the noes had it. "it was not a
matter of majority rule." He then adds. in a tantalizing parentheti-
cal. "In that sense the noes have probably never had it. ••6 The
ironic point of Stout's comment is that this refusal to countenance a
role for frankly religious expression in public moral debate arises in
a nation that. so the pollsters tell us. is about as religious as any in
the Western world.7
Now of course, that might be the reason for the ban, for the
United States not only is religious but represents a rich and remark-
able diversity of religious faiths. To allow openly religious views in
public debate, so the traditional theory goes. would at best cause
cacaphony. as we all talked past one another. and at worst, should
one set of views begin to prevail, cause a dogmatically religious
authoritarianism.
Well. what about the point that we are as morally diverse as we
are religously diverse, and yet we allow all sorts of moral views to
be expressed and even imposed? How is religion different? There
are two standard answers to this. The first is that people of strong
religious sentiment are far less open to reason than people of other
strong moral sentiments and are, therefore, more of a threat to lib-
eral dialogue. I will have a bit more to say about this point toward
the end of the lecture. For the moment, I would simply like to
point out that the proposition that the moralist whose views are
based on faith is more closed-minded than the moralist whose views
have other roots is an empirical proposition, one that is usually as-
sumed, occasionally argued for (albeit weakly) but, as far as I am
aware, never tested. It is also profoundly insulting to the religiously
devout-which leads to the second standard answer.
The second standard answer to the question of why religious
views are treated differently in public debate than other moral views
is that religion is more important, a more fundamental aspect of the
human personality. Therefore, we must be more sensitive to the
possibility of official displacement of religious belief than to the pos-
sibility of official displacement of belief systems of other kinds. In
the official story, it is precisely to protect religion, not to disable it,
that the establishment clause exists.
6 J. STOUT, supra note 4, at ISO.
7 Part of the following discussion is anticipated in Carter, The Religiously Devout
Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932 (1989).
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One problem with this response is that it potentially turns in
upon itself. If religious beliefs are truly more fundamental in the
sense of being more ingrained, then presumably we need worry less
about official intrusion on them, for they are far less likely to be
susceptible to pressure. But that is only an internal critique. I fully
recognize that the problem of intruding officially on religious beliefs
is one of considerable complexity, and that permitting a religious
voice in secular dialogue can be a profoundly isolating, even alienat-
ing, experience for dialogic losers whose religious views are quite
different from those that have carried the day. I will have a bit
more to say about this problem in a moment, but I hardly expect to
resolve it for all purposes here tonight.
No, my main problem with the answer that we keep religion out
of public debate because we cherish it so is that the answer is false.
The evidence of cases interpreting the establishment clause as well
as leading theories expounded to support those decisions illustrates
that far from cherishing religion, we are moving toward a society in
which religion is treated as a sort of public embarassment, some-
thing not fit for polite company. This is what I have called else-
where "treating religion like a hobby."s
My claim is that an unhappy corner of contemporary establish-
ment clause jurisprudence, as well as what might represent the
mainstream legal scholarship in the field, gives lip service to the
principle of government neutrality but in actual effect leads to infer-
ior treatment; that is, our establishment clause requires the govern-
ment to treat religious groups and individuals worse than it treats
other groups and individuals.
When I say that the establishment clause has brought about a
situation in which religious organizations are treated worse than,
not the same as, organizations of other kinds, I mean that legal
privileges available to other organizations are denied to groups that
are openly religious. Let me offer an example from my other princi-
pal field of scholarly endeavor, intellectual property. As you may
know, there are two ways of obtaining a copyright. First, the appli-
cant may comply with the requirements of the Copyright Act. Sec-
ond, the applicant may persuade Congress to grant the copyright
through a private law. Now suppose that the applicant is a religious
organization, Faith A, and the work on which the copyright is
sought is a religious text, Text Z. Faith A might avail itself of the
8 See Carter, Evolutionism. Creationism. and Treating Religion as a Hobby, 1987
DUKE L.J. 977.
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statute, or, if the statute proves inconvenient, Faith A might do
what any other group might do--obtain the copyright through a
private law.
Suppose, however, that Faith B then wants to use the same reli-
gious text, Text Z, in its worship. Faith B might purchase copies of
Text Z from Faith A, or it might pay Faith A for a license enabling
it to print copies of Text Z itself. Because Text Z is a religious text,
however, and Faith A is a religious organization, another option is
available. Faith B might challenge the private law as a violation of
the establishment clause. And, because of the prohibition on exces-
sive entanglements, Faith B might well prevail.
I hope that this example does not seem farfetched, because I have
in mind a specific case, United Christian Scientists v. Christian Sci-
ence Board ofDirectors,9 a decision by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. The author of the decision was
Spottswood W. Robinson, III, a truly outstanding and inspiring
judge for whom I was privileged to serve as a law clerk some years
back. I hold, and have always held, the highest regard and admira-
tion for Judge Robinson. I have fond memories of the hours we
spent arguing-arguments that I generally lost, and with reason.
This time, however, I think that Judge Robinson got it wrong.
United Christian Scientists involved the constitutionality of Pri-
vate Law 92-60, which granted a copyright on Science and Health
with Key to Scriptures, the central text of the Christian Science faith,
to the Christian Science Board of Directors of the First Church of
Christ, Scientist. A dissenting group of Christian Scientists, known
as United Christian Scientists, challenged the copyright, arguing
that the private law violated the establishment clause. The court of
appeals agreed.
The court acknowledged that religious works are eligible for
copyright protection, but suggested that "Private Law 92-60 confers
upon a religious body an unusual measure of copyright protection
by unusual means," and pointed out that but for the private law, the
underlying work "would now be in the public domain." 10 That
much, of course, does not differentiate the First Church of Christ,
Scientist, from any other beneficiary of a private law copyright,
although it is true that there haven't been so many. In fact, it
makes the First Church of Christ, Scientist, very much like the
United States Olympic Committee, whose special trademark rights,
9 829 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
10 Id. at 1159.
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also granted by special, statute, were recently sustained by the
Supreme Court. II But, the panel held, there is also an important
difference: the establishment clause prohibits entanglements be-
tween government and religious organizations, and the First
Church of Christ, Scientist, is a religious organization. In granting
the copyright by statute, the Congress "unequivocally and unquali-
fiedly endorsed First Church as first interpreter and guardian of
that work.,,12 And that, the court concluded, constituted an "im-
permissible message of sectarian endorsement."13
The appeal of this approach is plain. The presence of the estab-
lishment clause makes the notion of government selection among
competing claimants to the same religious text a rather unpleasant
one. And yet, there remains the simple difficulty that, had the First
Church of Christ, Scientist been a non-profit organization with
some non-religious purpose, the case would have come out the other
way. Any group but a religious group can choose which copyright
option to pursue. For a religious organization, however, the options
are circumscribed. In that narrow sense, a religious organization is
treated worse.
I don't think the United Christian Scientists case is unique. Think
for a moment about the recently enacted federal Equal Access Act,
the constitutionality of which was the subject of heated academic
debate. 14 The Act provides, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which re-
ceives Federal financial assistance and which has a limited open
forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discrimi-
nate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within
that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political,
philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings. IS
On its face, this statute would seem to promote liberal dialogue by
prohibiting schools from discriminating among student organiza-
tions based on their ideas, and in that sense, the law is a logical
extension of Widmar v. Vincent,16 wherein the Court ruled (quite
correctly, in my view) that a state university that opens its facilities
11 See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522 (1987).
12 United Christian Scientists, 829 F.2d at 1170.
13/d. at 1171.
14 The Supreme Court has recently resolved the debate, sustaining the constitutional-
ity of the Act. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
IS 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1988).
16 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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to student groups cannot exclude those groups that meet for reli-
gious purposes.
Some commentators, however, have argued that the Equal Ac-
cess Act is an unconstitutional entanglement of church and state, 17
and at least one federal court has so held. 18 Whatever the theoreti-
cal justification for that result (I do not want to pursue the matter
here, although 1 will return to it in a moment), the one unambigu-
ous result is that the establishment clause is being read to deny to
religious organizations privileges that organizations of other sorts
regularly enjoy. So here, once again, the risk of neutrality is that
the religious groups that the clause was written to protect are actu-
ally being treated worse than others.
B. Empirical Morality and Religious Objections to the Public
School Curriculum
The real battleground, of course, is the schools. That is where
everything is at stake, for the battle is quite literally over who shall
control the future. The children, after all, are the future, and they
are required by law to go to school. Most of them attend public
schools, which are more directly susceptible than private schools to
political control. Because control is possible to achieve, everybody
wants to achieve it.
The ideal school, liberals have long argued, would be an essen-
tially neutral forum in which students' critical faculties would be
trained through an exposure to different points of view. In the
words of David Richards, the school should be a place for "training
in ... neutral method[s] of critical inquiry, expressive of our capaci-
ties of epistemic rationality ...."19 The idea sounds fine in theory.
Unfortunately, as Lawrence Friedman has pointed out, the school is
the one place where "pluralism can easily run up against a stone
wall."20 It is all very well to say that ideally the schools ought to
favor no one point ofview.21 But, as Friedman notes, "it is impossi-
ble to give everybody a piece of the action; there are too many
17 See, e.g., Strossen, A Constitutional Analysis of the Equal Access Act's Standards
Governing Public School Student Religious Meetings, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 117 (1987);
Teitel, When Separate is Equal: Why Organized Religious Exercises. Unlike Chess, Do
Not Belong in the Public Schools, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 174 (1986).
180ark v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 671 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
19 D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 154 (1986).
20 L. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 122 (1985).
21 Cf D. RICHARDS, supra note 19; M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS:
POLmcs, LAW, AND GoVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 213-33 (1983).
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actors. ,,22
Among the actors most frequently cast as villains in the liberal
drama are parents who are concerned that the public schools are
indoctrinating their children with a "secular humanist" view of the
world-a vision in which both morality and the scope of human
possibility are limited by what is material and observable, a vision in
which God has no place. This bestowal of villainhood seems a bit
unfair. I will confess that I have as little patience as the next person
with politicians who harp on the school prayer cases as "putting
God out of the classroom," but it is easy to see why fundamentalist
Christian parents fear that their children are being trained to put
God out of their lives. The purpose of public education is to pre-
pare those who are educated for fruitful and productive lives in so-
ciety. Some parents contend that what public education is really
doing is prodding their children to reject the religious understand-
ing that the parents have worked so hard to teach.
The work of prominent liberal theorists is full of references to
education as a means for training the critical faculties so that stu-
dents can learn to make up their own minds about what to accept
and what to reject. The caricature version of fundamentalist par-
ents, and other worried parents as well, is that they are simply
afraid of what will happen when ordinary critical methods are
turned upon their religious beliefs. But I am not sure that the mat-
ter is that simple. I would rather put it this way: the parents' fear is
rejection of their entire epistemology-an epistemology that might
include, for example, a quite sophisticated hermeneutic of Biblical
inerrancy.23 Consequently, the problem is not that the parents
doubt that their beliefs can withstand critical scrutiny; the argu-
ment is over what counts as criticism.24
Here again the pluralism problem arises. To borrow from Law-
rence Friedman once more, "there are matters that cannot be rec-
onciled. Either God made birds, bees, monkeys, lizards, woman,
and man in a single week, or else they evolved as Darwin and mod-
em biologists have it. Schools cannot fudge this question en-
tirely."2s The modem way, of course, is not to fudge it at all unless
so required by law, and if there is a law that bears on the point at
22 L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 20.
23 See The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics, in A GUIDE TO CONTEMPO-
RARY HERMENEUTICS: MAJOR TRENDS IN BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 21 (D. McKim
ed. 1986).
24 For a general discussion, see Carter, supra note 8.
2S L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 20, at 123.
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all, a court will almost certainly hold it unconstitutional. The cases
are consistent on this point: By banning evolution, or requiring that
evolution be taught as theory rather than fact, or requiring equal
time for scientific creationism, the state is not protecting the parents
but imposing religious belief. That the establishment clause forbids.
Anything else-including teaching critical approaches that might
wean children from the religion of their parents-is perfectly all
right. Thus, the liberal answer to this dilemma seems to come to
this: "We already fought that battle, and it was called the Enlight-
enment, and we won, so tough luck-you lose."
"But wait," you might say, "Carter's got it wrong again. The
parents don't always lose. It all turns on whether they are trying to
protect their own children or impose their beliefs more widely than
on their own children."
That is indeed a distinction, and a useful one, although it is im-
portant to place it in its context. So I agree, for example, that when
one is thinking about schoolchildren, the threat of proselytizing in a
coercive setting is ever-present. This is why organized classroom
prayer is bad, and, possibly, why moments of silence are bad, too; at
least if, as in Wallace v. Jaffree,26 the state has no particular objec-
tive in mind other than the encouragement of the very prayer that
the school prayer cases properly found coercive. But it is less clear
that the scientific creationism dispute fits this model. True, it is
possible to characterize the teaching of creationism as an effort to
impose religious belief, but it is just as possible, and, I think, far
more plausible, to view it as a battle between competing epistemo-
logical systems, each of which, when judged in terms of the other,
yields conclusions that are demonstrably wrong.
But, even if we once more put the epistemological problem to one
side, what we discover nevertheless is that while other critiques of
the school curriculum-that it is racist or sexist, for example-are
admitted as valid criticisms that must be answered or satisfied, a
religious critique alone is placed out of bounds. So, in the schools
as elsewhere, citizens whose views rest on religious knowledge are
denied privileges that other citizens enjoy. "But there's Yoder," you
might object. "What about Yoder?"
A good question, perhaps the central one, and more important by
far than the matter of equal time for scientific creationism. Yoder, I
hasten to add for the non-lawyers among you, is not the name of the
26 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
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Jedi Master who taught Luke Skywalker the ways of the Force, but
rather the name of a Supreme Court decision. The full name is Wis-
consin v. Yoder,27 and in that case, the Justices sustained on free
exercise grounds the refusal of Old Order Amish parents to send
their children to public schools beyond the eighth grade. Yoder has
long been a controversial decision, in part because, the critics fear,
the case totters at the edge of the slippery slope, down which lie all
manner of harms that parents might do to children in the name of
religious belief. Perhaps in response to criticism, subsequent deci-
sions have limited Yoder very nearly to its facts, and the facts to
which it has been limited are quite revealing.
The Yoder majority repeatedly emphasized one facet of the
Amish community-the community's nearly complete isolation
from the rest of the world. The Court used the isolation of the
Amish to refute the claim by the state that compulsory education
was a necessity to prepare children for the challenges of adult life:
It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two
beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the
preparation of the child for life in modern society as the majority
live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as
the preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian
community that is the keystone of the Amish faith. 28
It is not news to note that this passage begs its question, but I have a
different criticism in mind, one that is better made after quoting two
more passages. First, in the very next paragraph, the majority
opined: "Whatever their idiosyncracies as seen by the majority, this
record strongly shows that the Amish community has been a highly
successful social unit within our society even if apart from the con-
ventional'mainstream'."29 And then, in response to the state's sug-
gestion that the children not educated past the eighth grade might
one day leave the community and later need the skills denied them
by their early exit from school, the Justices explained: "[O]n this
record, that argument is highly speculative. There is no specific evi-
dence of the loss of Amish adherents by attrition, nor is there any
showing that upon leaving the Amish community Amish children
... would become burdens on society because of educational short-
comings."30 Thus the majority's conclusion seems to be that the
reason it is all right for Amish parents to remove their children
27 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
28 [d. at 222.
29 [d.
30 [d. at 224.
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from school after the eighth grade is that they all live off by them-
selves, in a self-sufficient, separated community. In other words,
the Amish don't bother anybody; the rest of the country can, if it
chooses, ignore them entirely.
This is what I mean by treating religion as a hobby. The estab-
lishment clause, as we have seen, prohibits any public dialogue
aimed at promoting moral positions supported by a faith-based epis-
temology. Now it turns out that the free exercise clause leaves the
adherents free to pursue their religious beliefs only when it is possi-
ble to show in detail that nobody is bothered by them.
C. A Doctrinal Interlude
How did our establishment clause jurisprudence reach this unfor-
tunate pass? I would suggest that the courts were headed for
trouble from the moment they began looking for the religious moti-
vations of legislators. After all, in a nation with so many religiously
devout people, there is a very substantial likelihood that religious
motivation will form an important part of our legislators' decisions
on whether to support many different sorts of legislation. The
Lemon v. Kurtzman 31 test for establishment clause violations, estab-
lished by the Supreme Court twenty years ago, asks, among other
questions, whether the legislation has a secular purpose or not. But
as subsequent decisions have made clear, the term "purpose" in
Lemon is much closer to "motivation" than to "effect." So once
Lemon became the law of the land, an inquiry into motivation was
scarcely avoidable.
A serious prohibition on religious motivation is likely to be un-
workable. Consider, for example, the call of the Roman Catholic
bishops for a nuclear weapons freeze. Is a freeze prohibited if it
turns out that the Catholic bishops played a major role? What
about the religious motivation of the abolitionists or, a century
later, the deep religious roots and open theological justification for
the civil rights movement? Well, one might respond that there are
mixed secular and religious purposes in these examples, but one is
hardly sure what that means. Is there really a defensible difference
in motivation between the statements "Oppression of black people is
contrary to God's will" and "Killing of fetuses is contrary to God's
will"? There might be a difference in real-world result. The latter,
if turned into policy, would infringe on what is so far a fundamental
31 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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constitutional right, but that simply points up the problem with
Lemon. It would be far better to judge alleged establishment clause
violations by their results rather than their motivations.
And what effects ought to matter? I would argue that the effects
that ought to matter are effects that actually establish religion.
That is, unconstitutional statutes should be not those that are in
some sense religiously motivated, but rather, as Michael McConnell
has proposed, be those that have the effect of endorsing religion in a
coercive setting. So the President's declaration of a national day of
prayer would not represent an establishment of religion, but a pub-
lic elementary school's declaration of a day of prayer would. And
what of the recurring cases about religious symbols on or in public
buildings? It hurts me to say so, particularly in light of last night's
lecture, but I fear that each case would have to be judged on its
facts.
The reason that an effects test seems doctrinally difficult is that
our establishment clause jurisprudence has, until now, been deeply
steeped in a metaphorical wall between church and state. It's the
wall that leads to the motivation test, for an inquiry into motivation
is seen as perhaps the only way to keep the wall up.
I know that any number of theorists (and lately, some Justices,
tOO) have offered the view that the idea of a wall is ahistorical, but
my concern is not originalist. My concern is with the reasons that
anyone might suppose that a wall ought to exist. To work this out,
one must decide why there is an establishment clause at all. One
might simply say, "The separation of church and state helps every-
one, the state, the church, and individuals, whether religious or
not." But this is sophistry. In the first place, it isn't clear that the
separation helps everyone. Undoubtedly, there are some people in
the country who place a very high value on the ability to write the
tenets of their faith into law. Imagine that Faith A commands its
adherents to ensure that their nation is run in accordance with the
teaching of Faith A. Adherents of Faith A are then hurt, not
helped, if they are forbidden to do so. One might of course offer the
paternalistic response, "They don't really know what's best for
themselves." But that is like saying that following the dictates of
Faith A is bad for the adherents, which represents another version
of the hostility to religious faith that I have already discussed. Or
one might say, "The adherents of Faith A are helped by the wall
between church and state because others will not be allowed to im-
pose the tenets of Faith B on them." It isn't at all clear, however,
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that adherents of Faith A would see matters this way. Not only
might they prefer to risk losing out to Faith B rather than be forced
to ignore the tenets of Faith A, they might believe that God will
protect them from having Faith B imposed.32
Moreover, one cannot readily assume that either the state or
other citizens are better off with the protection of a wall between
church and state, at least not without some a priori assumptions
about the validity of faith. Perhaps the policies that Faith A would
demand, quite apart from the motivation behind them, are readily
defensible in secular liberal terms. Once more, I give you the exam-
ple of the abolitionists. Certainly the adherent of Faith A would
look at the state and say that the state is better off if it subjects itself
voluntarily to God's will as revealed to A. Or she might look at
citizens not adhering to Faith A and say that they, too, are better off
in a state governed in accordance with God's will as revealed to A.
There is no reasonable sense in which these statements can be
said to be false unless one knows the substantive content of God's
will as revealed to A. Of course, one might offer a statistical claim,
asserting that those who are moved by their faith to intervene in the
real world of politics are likely to be advocates of policies that are,
in liberal terms, objectionable. But that argument would come as a
considerable surprise, as well as a considerable insult, to veterans of
the non-violent civil rights movement, a movement inspired from its
earliest days by theological arguments. 33
No, I think that the liberal fear of religion's role in dialogue is
based on something else. The fear is rooted in a critique of the epis-
32 One might then say that God will surely enable them to impose Faith A without
the assistance of the state, but it is difficult to guess at the mysteries of the faith of
another.
33 One reader responded to an earlier draft of this paper by challenging my reference
to the civil rights movement with the suggestion that the civil rights movement was
responding to an oppression so deeply ingrained, and so resistant to other responses,
that "rolling out the big guns"-including religious leaders-was not only appropriate,
but necessary. But, the reader argued, the big guns should be reserved for the most
egregious evils, and their use should not be taken as precedent in the ordinary opera-
tions of secular governance. This point, while obviously well taken, potentially runs
afoul of the rule of recognition problem: Which evils count as egregious? Some deeply
religious people (and some who are not) would argue that abortion is such an evil;
others, nuclear weapons; still others, poverty and hunger. I am not sure what principle
to offer to explain to someone else how to choose among these putative evils. One possi-
bility is to insist on a secular model of what counts as egregious, but that might serve
once again to trivialize religion by saying, in effect, that these mountebanks, these cult
leaders, should be trotted out to appeal to the superstitious when we right-thinking
liberals think the time is right, and should otherwise mind their own business.
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temology of faith. People of deep religious beliefs make decisions in
ways that are foreign to the rhetoric of liberalism; they have a habit
of appealing to God as their authority, as though the Enlightenment
never occurred. Those religionists, in other words, are not amena-
ble to reason.
Consider Bruce Ackerman's explanation of why appeal to divine
revelation cannot be used to settle disagreements on matters of pol-
icy. He sets up a dialogue between two interlocutors, Democrat
and Diviner. Diviner insists that "we should leave the decision in
the hands of this black box that God has been so kind as to pro-
vide." Democrat responds, "I insist that you take my word for it,"
because the dispute is not between Democrat and God, but between
Democrat and Diviner's version of the word of God. When Diviner
turns the tables and refuses to take Democrat's word either, Demo-
crat is unbothered:
I am not trying to be a dictator. While I am happy to concede
that my opinion may be outweighed by the contrary opinions of
my fellow citizens, I am unwilling to have my views ignored
merely because you believe that your divination procedure pro-
vides a better way of resolving our policr. problem than my con-
sidered judgments on the liberal merits. 4
At best, this dialogue warns against abandoning individual reason
to adopt the word of some person who claims possession of a direct
line to God's wisdom. Suppose, however, that Diviner goes out and
begins to preach and convinces most people that God's word is in-
deed as Diviner has claimed. Suppose further that the people de-
cide to base their law on God's will. Now suddenly Democrat is
being asked to yield not simply to Diviner's interpretation, but to
the contrary opinions of fellow citizens-precisely what, in the dia-
logue, Democrat implies would be sufficient.
Nor can Ackerman escape by rejecting the acts of the fellow citi-
zens on the ground that they do not accord with liberal neutrality.
As Ackerman recognizes, there is real epistemological conflict
here. 3s All he is able to offer, finally, is a warning to the religiously
devout:
It is better to recognize the inevitability of sin, and hope for di-
vine salvation, than to play the role of God's avenging angel on
earth. It is worse than foolish to try to anticipate the day of final
judgment. It is sensible for the religious, no less than the skepti-
cal, to reason their way to an acceptance of Neutrality-for this
34 B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 281 (1980).
3S [d. at 364-65.
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conversational constraint is merely a device for marking the con-
ceptual boundary on the secular authority of all those who pre-
tend to be God's vice-regent on earth.36
As Ackerman himself admits in the next paragraph, however,
"[n]one ofthis ... must necessarily convince a true believer ... .'037
Ackerman goes on to say why, but the reasons that he gives, which
I will not trouble to quote here, are rather denigrating to both the
charity and the rationality of the religious. The truth is simpler; the
reason that none of this need convince a true believer is that a true
believer, by definition, truly believes. If Diviner truly believes that
God's will requires certain statutes in an imperfect earthly world-
be they statutes banning abortion, banning the death penalty, or
banning nuclear weapons-why is the possibility that others might
disagree or even prevail a reason not to try? I would suggest that it
is no reason at all. Similarly, the fact that others may enact legisla-
tion that goes the other way is no argument against the efforts of
secular moralists to convince the government to enact what they
believe it should.
But Ackerman seeks to differentiate the two. It is all right to
make a moral argument with a secular base; it is not all right to
make a moral argument with a religious base. Michael Perry, in
describing a hypothetical dialogue that he might conduct with Ack-
erman, explained succinctly how this distinction disadvantages the
religiously devout citizen who seeks to enter the liberal
conversation:
Ackerman might get to rely on all or most of his relevant beliefs,
including his most important relevant beliefs, while I would get
to rely only on some of my relevant beliefs, not including the
most important ones: my religious convictions. In that sense
Ackerman might get to rely on much of the relevant part of his
web of beliefs while I would get to rely on strands of my web-
strands approved ("shared") by Ackerman. I fail to see what is
"neutral" about such a practice of political justification.38
There is force to Perry's criticism, for it captures nicely the diffi-
culty that exclusionary dialogic rules pose for citizens whose moral
convictions are strongly influenced by prior religious convictions.
Still, I do not take Ackerman to disagree with another recent pro-
ponent of neutral dialogue, David Richards, who argues that "we
should use the tools of constitutional analysis not to examine the
36 [d. at 364.
37 [d.
38 Perry, Neutral Politics?, 51 REV. POL. 479,484 (1989) (footnote omitted).
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groups who advocate claims, but to scrutinize the claims
advocated."39
Richards' point, of course (Ackerman's too), is that some argu-
ments cannot be scrutinized in a neutral way and that those argu-
ments should be excluded. But matters are never quite so simple.
Suppose, for example, that one opposes abortion with the following
argument:
(1) It is wrong to deny to any soul the opportunity for
salvation.
(2) If the body dies before the soul is released from original sin
through Baptism, the soul may not find salvation.
(3) Therefore, it is wrong to let the body die before Baptism.
(4) The unborn fetus possesses a soul.
(5) Therefore, it is wrong to kill an unbaptized fetus.
I think that Richards and Ackerman would say, albeit for slightly
differing reasons, that this critique of abortion is not a neutral argu-
ment. Its moral premises rest on a privileged and inaccessible epis-
temology (Soul + Baptism = Salvation), and its factual premise-
the claim of fetal ensoulment--either does not really make a factual
claim, or, at best, makes a factual claim that is not verifiable in the
material world. Besides, says Richards, "[m]oral people are not re-
quired to guide their moral conduct according to metaphysical as-
sumptions they do not reasonably believe ...."40
The difficulty is that for many devoutly religious people, the dis-
tinction between moral truth and empirical (material) truth is not as
clean as these dialogic theories require. Many Christians, for exam-
ple, might take the view of the theologian Karl Rahner, who argues
that our existence as moral beings is grounded in our experience of
"[t]he difference between what we simply in fact are and what we
should be" according to God's will, and that "this difference is al-
ways found as something concrete, not as something abstract."41
The difference, like God's will, is seen as real: no metaphysics, just
the fact of God, the fact of divine command, and the fact of differ-
ence. In opening his Gifford Lectures nearly a century ago, William
James complained that "many religious persons ... do not yet make
39 D. RICHARDS, supra note 19, at 254.
40 Id. at 265.
41 K. RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
IDEA OF CHRISTIANITY 407-08 (1978).
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a working use of the distinction" between facts and values.42 But
James, so wise in other matters, missed the point here. The point is
that for many believers the fact/value distinction, in the existential
sense that James had in mind, is simply beside the point.43
That is what worries liberal moral theorists and, by extension,
liberal constitutional theorists. Religiously devout people have a
different, and quite threatening, way of looking at the world. I fear
that this way of thinking about religion has its basis in an anti-reli-
gious prejudice. That is, a sense that people whose moral judg-
ments are rooted in religious devotion are more likely than other
people to be closed-minded. To put the matter simply, they refuse
to think, at least the way that liberal theory says people should
think, and this refusal makes them dangerous fanatics.
I find this ground unconvincing. I am not at all sure that people
whose moral judgments are based explicitly on religious premises
are more closed-minded than anyone else who might engage in pub-
lic moral dialogue. There are a lot of people with strong moral
views who will not abandon them easily and not all of them are
religiously devout. I worry, moreover, that the tendency among lib-
eral theorists to treat the religiously devout as dangerous primitives
bespeaks a hostility toward religion itself. But, my purpose tonight
is not to argue against the claim of closed-mindedness. I only want
to trace its implications. So, assuming for the sake of argument that
people whose morality stems from religious belief are less inclined
than others to change their minds on moral questions, what should
liberal theory do?
Well, first of all, we know what liberal theory does do. It holds
that those people whose religious devotion makes them not amena-
ble to reason are not welcome in the public moral dialogue on
which liberalism depends. But mediating the dialogue through a
rationality requirement that excludes many of the religiously devout
from the dialogue is obviously not the answer. Quite apart from the
matter of insult that I have already discussed, there is the troubling
question of who gets to decide what the mediating dialogic require-
ment is going to be. After all, as Stephen Holmes has noted in dis-
cussing what he calls "gag rules," "[i]n a liberal social order, the
42 W. JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN
NATURE 6 (1929).
43 Cf R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 157-58 (1975) ("The contrast of un-
derstanding and evaluation is foreign to the religious consciousness, for its beliefs about
the world are simlutaneously descriptions and ideals. ").
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basic normative framework must be able to command the loyalty of
individuals and groups with widely differing self-understandings
and conceptions of personal fulfillment."44 For Holmes, this is a
reason that liberal theory must "steer clear of irresolvable meta-
physical disputes,,,4S but in practice the insight points in a some-
what different direction. For the simple truth about American
society in the late twentieth century is that a dialogic rule that does
not permit religious convictions to enter the policy debate, for all its
theoretical fairness, cannot "command the loyalty of individuals
and groups with widely differing self-understandings."46 Millions,
perhaps tens of millions, of Americans are deeply offended as well
as perplexed when told that their most deeply felt moral beliefs are
·not suitable for public debate because their consciences were formed
through the wrong process. And, indeed, it is fair to ask what sort
of liberalism we have if the primacy of conscience only extends to
those citizens whose epistemologies are of the proper kind.
The trouble with trying to confine religion to a private sphere is
not simply that it denigrates religious as opposed to other ways of
knowing moral (to say nothing of factual) truths. What may be a
larger problem is that the effort misconceives the nature of religion
itself. In the first place, as Michael Perry has pointed out, to insist
that religious morality remain a matter of private conscience, to ask
citizens to bracket the religious convictions essential to their charac-
ter from their moral reasoning, might result in a destruction of self,
for the religious are told, in so many words, "You are useless to
liberal dialogue as you are."47 Moreover, as David Tracy has noted
in his effort to sketch a "post-modernist" theology, a religion is not
the same as an idle reflection. It is worth quoting him at length:
Despite their own sin and ignorance, the religions, at their best,
always bear extraordinary powers of resistance. When not do-
mesticated as sacred canopies for the status quo nor wasted by
their own self-contradictory grasps at power, the religions live by
resisting. The chief resistance of religions is to more of the
same. . .. The religions also resist the temptations of many post-
modernists to see the problem but not to act. But the religions
also join secular postmodernity in resisting all earlier modern,
liberal, or neoconservative contentment with the ordinary dis-
44 Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DE-
MOCRACY 19, 20-21 (J. Elster & R. Siagstad eds. 1988).
4S /d.
46/d.
47 See M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS AND LAW: A BICENTENNIAL EsSAY 72-73
(1988).
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course on rationality and the self.48
A religion, in this picture, is not simply a means for understanding
one's self, nor even of contemplating the nature of the universe, of
existence, or of anything else. A religion is, at its heart, a way of
denying the authority of the rest of the world; it is a way of saying
to fellow human beings and to the state those fellow humans have
erected, "No, I will not accede to your will." This a radically desta-
bilizing proposition that was central not only to the civil resistance
of King and Gandhi, but also to Operation Rescue. Mark Tushnet
has suggested that it is precisely this ultimate radical possibility of
refusing to accept the will of the state that leads to liberalism's sus-
picion toward religious belief.49 Perhaps so; for the nature of reli-
gion is finally not simply to know, but to act, and to act at times
without regard to what others regard as the facts. Thus, quoting
Tracy once more: "[A]bove all, the religions are exercises in resist-
ance. Whether seen as Utopian visions or believed in as revelations
of Ultimate Reality, the religions reveal various possibilities for
human freedom that are not intended for that curious distancing act
that has become second nature to our aesthetic sensibilities."so This
idea is a very subversive one, but religion is a very subversive force;
subversive, at least, in a state committed to the proposition that
only one epistemology counts. No wonder liberalism is afraid.
D. Empirical Morality and the Free Exercise Clause
By way of illustrating the epistemological point in a bit more de-
tail, I would like to take examples that involve the free exercise
clause rather than the establishment clause. This is not because I
have a sudden yen to muddy the free exercise waters. Indeed, it is
not my purpose tonight to analyze the free exercise clause as such.
But by looking at the way that certain cases have been approached
under the free exercise clause, I hope to illustrate the impossibility
of liberal constitutional dialogue coming to serious terms with a vi-
sion of the world that does not demand materialistic evidence as
proof of facts.
First, I would like to keep my promise of last night and say a few
48 D. TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE 83-
84 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
49 See M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 269-76 (1988).
50 D. TRACY, supra note 48, at 84 (footnote omitted).
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words about Employment Division v. Smith. 51 The Smith case in-
volves two former employees of the State of Oregon who were dis-
missed from their positions for ingesting peyote, a controlled
substance, in religious observances of the Native American Church,
of which they were members at the time. The question is whether
they are entitled to unemployment compensation. On remand from
an earlier decision ofthe Supreme Court of the United States, which
sought a clarification, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that the
dismissed employees were entitled to unemployment compensation
because "outright prohibition of good faith religious use of peyote
by adult members of the Native American Church would violate
the First Amendment ...."52 Maybe this is right. I don't want to
get into a discussion tonight of whether the decision is right or
wrong. I will mention, however, that the fear of the state and other
critics is, of course, the slippery slope: perhaps every drug abuser
will claim a religious requirement. And what about the snake-han-
dlers and those who violate a wide variety of other laws?
Douglas Laycock, in defending the Smith decision, suggested the
possibility of a limiting principle. Perhaps, he says, protection
might be limited to "groups that can point to some substantial tra-
dition and that limit the use of drugs to structured worship ser-
vice."53 But Laycock's effort to offer a pragmatic answer conceals a
difficulty. Tomorrow, a long-time adherent of Faith A might an-
nounce a revelation and the need to found Faith B, a central tenet
of which just happens to involve the use of currently proscribed
mind-altering substances. Why should Faith A, if it happens to
hold a similar tenet, have the advantage over Faith B? Is it because
there is more reason to believe in the sincerity of the adherents of
Faith A? Why?
I do not mean to argue entirely by rhetorical questions. The
questions are leading up to another unsettling possibility. Suppose
that the revelation to the founder of Faith B happens to be true. By
this I mean, suppose that it really is God's will that adherents of
Faith B use mind-altering substances.
The quick answer, and perhaps the correct one, is that liberal law
can take no account of that possibility. Not that it is false, not that
51 Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68,73.763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988), rev'd, 110 S.
Ct. 1595 (1990).
52 307 Or. at 73, 763 P.2d at 148..
S3 Laycock, Peyote, Wine. and the First Amendment, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Oct. 4,
1989, at 876, 880.
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it is doubted, but simply that it cannot be permitted to carry weight.
And if this means that the Founder of Faith B cannot use mind-
altering substances and, therefore, faces the fires of hell, well, that's
not the law's problem; that's between the Founder and his God.
I wonder, though, whether this is an entirely satisfactory answer.
Think back on the Jehovah's Witness example. What we know
from the cases is roughly this: if a mature, conscious Jehovah's Wit-
ness refuses a blood transfusion to save her life, a court will not
order it; if a mature, conscious Jehovah's Witness refuses a blood
transfusion to save her life and then lapses into unconsciousness, a
court might well order it; if a mature Jehovah's Witness arrives at a
hospital already unconscious, and her family refuses permission for
a blood transfusion to save her life, a court will order it; and, if a
Jehovah's Witness parent refuses a blood transfusion to save the life
of a minor child, the court will temporarily suspend parental cus-
tody and appoint a guardian, who will invariably grant permission
for the transfusion.
In none of these cases does the court give much weight to the
proposition that accepting a transfusion will lead to eternal damna-
tion. But that is hardly surprising, because no notion of free exer-
cise is required to explain any of these decisions. The right of a
Jehovah's Witness to refuse a blood transfusion for herself or for a
family member seems, as a legal matter, to be of precisely the same
scope as the right of any individual to refuse life-saving medical
treatment for herself or for a member of the family. Mature adults
may refuse treatments that might save their lives, but they may only
rarely refuse those treatments on behalf of unconscious relatives-
generally, only in cases involving "heroic" measures-and they may
never refuse those treatments on behalf of minor children. 54 In
short, no matter what lip service might be paid to the free exercise
clause, the cases about blood transfusion seem to have nothing to do
with religion at all.
Perhaps that is unsurprising, given what I have said about the
private role of religion. But what sort of statement does it make
about the underlying religious belief itself? I said earlier that the
liberal would respond that the refusal to take account of the claim
of perdition is not to say that it is false, only that it is irrelevant.
However, there is a logical sense in which the refusal to take ac-
54 They may sometimes refuse life-extending treatments, as in the Baby Jane Doe
case. Query the result in that case were it certain that the infant would have recovered
fully had treatment been undertaken.
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count of the claim is to treat it as false. For if the claim is true, life
eternal would seem plainly to trump the transient life available on
earth. Put otherwise, if the claim is true, the Witness is better off
dead-dead, that is, in the ordinary language, materialistic sense of
the word. By forcing the Witness to live and be damned rather than
permitting her to die and be saved, the state is necessarily treating
her religious claim not as irrelevant, but as false.
There is a far from semantic distinction between acting neutrally
toward a religious belief-refusing to consider it as either true or
false-and acting as though it is false. Again, think back on the
Ayatollah's death sentence on Salman Rushdie. Would it matter
much to the critics who charge fanaticism if the Ayatollah's view
was that a death in this world cost Rushdie very little, because it
was the judgment of God that really mattered, and that Rushdie, if
after all not a blasphemer, might nevertheless gain eternal life?
Would it matter if this were Rushdie's own view? Perhaps not. But
I am reminded of Paul Brest's comment on the constitutionality of
the death penalty, and his hermeneutic and anti-historicist argu-
ment for giving little weight to the widespread agreement among
the founders that taking human life was sometimes appropriate
punishment for criminal behavior. Writes Brest:
The adopters of the [cruel and unusual punishment] clause ap-
parently never doubted that the death penalty was constitutional.
But was death the same event for inhabitants of the American
colonies in the late 18th century as it is two centuries later?
Death was not only a much more routine and public phenome-
non then, but the fear of death was more effectively contained
within a system of religious belief. Twentieth-century Americans
have a more secular cast of mind and seem less willing to accept
this dreadful, forbidden, solitary, and shameful event. The inter-
preter must therefore determine whether we view the death pen-
alty with the same attitude-whether of disgust or
ambivalence-that the adopters viewed their core examples of
cruel and unusual punishment. 55
Brest might well have added what is also true: death as a penalty
was long ago justified by the argument that God would correct the
errors of mortal man. I think Brest may still be wrong on his soci-
ology, because survey research suggests that Americans strongly
support both the death penalty and the concept of an afterlife, two
notions that he is surely right to link. I am also concerned that his
tone reflects the liberal tendency to dismiss religion that I have al-
55 Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV.
204, 220-21 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
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ready mentioned. But, I have a different criticism in mind. Sup-
pose that Brest is right, that Americans are much less certain today
than they once were about life after death, that "fear of death" is no
longer "effectively contained within a system of religious belief."56
I wonder why that should be the critical interpretive question in
determining whether their era is like ours. Why not the question
that suggests itself a bit more obviously, given the link between sup-
port for the death penalty and support for the concept of an after-
life? Why not ask instead "Is there life after death or not?"
Now, if that's not an idea to make the contemporary liberal con-
stitutionalist rise in disgust, I don't know what is. Of course liber-
alism can't answer that question. I'm not even sure that liberal
dialogue can treat it as a question. This is a matter of private con-
science, not for the state to know about or care about, isn't it? It's
just what one believes; morality and law play no part in it.
Except that that isn't so. Listen to the way the question is struc-
tured: "Is there a life after death or not?" The question is whether
a thing exists or not; it is a question intended to discover a fact. To
be sure, a liberal might say that asking whether there is an afterlife
is a question about belief not about fact. But to say so doesn't make
it so. After all, whatever else may be said about life after death, one
thing seems sure: either there is one or there isn't.
In this connection, I am reminded of Walter Murphy's novel The
Vicar of Christ, which includes a scene in which the Pope has in-
vited to dinner a group of seminarians and overhears two of them in
heated argument over the nature of the Holy Trinity. The Roman
Catholic church teaches that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Fa-
ther and the Son, whereas the Greek Orthodox Church insists that
the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone. Tiring at last of
their debate, the Pope leans over the table and asks "What are the
data?"57 When the seminarians seem confused, he adds an explana-
tion: "[Y]ou have been talking about a factual problem, not one of
logical relationships. Either the Holy Spirit proceeds one way or
He proceeds the other. Either is perfectly justifiable in logic. What
are the data on which we can determine which is correct?,,58
Now, that may not be good theology, but like the question of
whether there is or is not a life after death, the question of the pro-
cession of the Holy Spirit can be stated in a way that does not seem
56Id. at 22l.
57 W. MURPHY, THE VICAR OF CHRIST 538 (1979).
58Id.
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to offend any principle of liberal dialogue. In that sense, there is no
reason either to outlaw or laugh at the claim that either question
seeks a factual answer. There is, however, one difficulty common to
both inquiries: although stated as empirical propositions, they are
not readily and directly testable by material means. That is not,
please note, the same as saying that they are not testable at all. But
as I have already noted about scientific creationism, the issue of
testability might ultimately tum on what counts as evidence, which
is to say, the question is again epistemological.
Well, all right. Back to the Jehovah's Witnesses who refuse a
blood transfusion. I asked whether their objection, that accepting
blood would deny them eternal salvation, was a claim about fact or
a claim about value. What I hope that I have shown by now is that
that very question-fact or value--has meaning only in a particular
epistemology that considers factual propositions as those that are
testable against the material world, and considers a proposition fal-
sified whenever materialistic evidence runs against it. Thus, for ex-
ample, in deciding whether scientific creationism is a plausible
account of the origin of the earth and of humanity, the only evi-
dence that counts is the evidence of natural science, evidence that is
empirical in the sense of being both testable and measurable. The
evidence on which the creationist might have decided to accept the
proposition-Scripture itself-is out of bounds.
So, too, with the Jehovah's Witness. Even if the question of eter-
nal salvation is admitted arguendo to be one of fact, it leads to no
hypotheses testable against the natural world. All of its hypotheses
are testable only against God's word, and that is no sort of liberal
evidence.
But note the difference between the Witness who believes that a
transfusion will deny salvation and the creationist who believes that
the earth is relatively young and that there has been no significant
animal evolution. The creationist's position either leads to no hy-
potheses that are testable in the natural world, or if it does generate
testable hypotheses, they fail the tests of materialist science, and so
liberalism and liberal constitutionalism reject them. But the Wit-
nesses' claim leads to no hypotheses testable in the natural world,
and is still rejected. This distinction is crucial. It is one thing for
liberalism to say, "Our epistemology trumps your epistemology, so
when there is a conflict we win." But in the case of the Jehovah's
Witnesses, there is no conflict, because liberal materialist epistemol-
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ogy takes no position. The same is true of those who wish to use
peyote in a religious ritual; no epistemological conflict exists.
So when we move from the establishment clause to the free exer-
cise clause, what we learn is that liberal constitutionalism rejects the
epistemology of faith even when the results yielded by that episte-
mology are not in conflict with the results offered by the materialist
epistemology that liberalism prefers. This cannot be justified on the
ground that the religious views have been displaced by the evidence;
it cannot be justified on the ground that the religionists in question
are trying to impose their views on society; it can only be justified
on the ground that the religionists are taking their views out of the
private sphere to which liberalism consigns them and are trying to
use those views as the basis for public acts. And public conduct
intended to tum faith into action-unless the conduct is in pursuit
of some expressly liberal end, as in the civil rights movement-is
something that is difficult for liberalism to countenance.
E. Liberal Dialogue and the Danger of Elitism
So that is where liberal theory, and liberal law, leave us. People
who are religiously devout are not supposed to make trouble; they
are supposed to be too embarassed to show a willingness to risk
their material selves for some metaphysical promise of eternal life.
And if they do want to take such risks, they cannot expect the
courts to go along with them. Why not? Because they are illiberal.
Because they are fanatics. Because Stoppard was right after all.
The noes do have it.
At least, the noes have it in liberal theory. But that aspect of
liberal theory can hardly be expected to be popular in a nation as
consciously, if pluralistically, religious as this one. A large part of
the trouble, of course, is that not everyone agrees that the Enlight-
enment was a good idea. Suppose that the Enlightenment project of
replacing divine moral authority with the moral authority of reason
failed not, as Alasdair MacIntyre suggests, because the post-En-
lightenment philosophers proceeded from a set of shared, histori-
cally contingent, and utterly incoherent assumptions,59 but because
of a psychological problem. Perhaps most people are upset with the
idea that morality is itself contingent, that ethical debates have no
right answers. Perhaps for many of us, the idea of moral authority
itself implies the existence of an arbiter, a proposition that would
59 See A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 49-75 (2d ed.
1984).
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help explain why a morally pluralistic nation like ours is willing to
let a court, of all things, settle many of our toughest moral dilem-
mas. No other agency of settlement seems to be available.
Except that, for tens of millions of Americans another authority
is available: divine command. It is relatively easy for well-educated
liberals to scoff at the idea that God's will is relevant to moral deci-
sions in the liberal state, but the citizen who is religiously devout
might ask why John Rawls' will, or Bruce Ackerman's will, or
David Richards' will, or, for that matter, the will of the Supreme
Court of the United States is more relevant to moral decisions than
God's. And so far, at least, I do not think that liberal theory has
presented an adequate answer.
So liberalism, as a theory of politics, is moving in an unsettling
direction. According to Richard Rorty, "[l]ogical positivism got a
bad name by calling religion and metaphysics 'nonsense' and by
seeming to dismiss the Age of Faith as a matter of incautious use of
language."60 Liberal dialogue seems to be headed down the same
road, and in a nation where so many citizens are centrally moved by
their religious convictions, unless there is a change of course, the
consequences for liberal theory are likely to prove disastrous. Is
there an alternative? Of course there is, and the physicist John
Ziman hints at it in his book Public Knowledge. Says Ziman:
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, prehistoric
remains were found that we now see as pointing to the great an-
tiquity of Man. But many scholars stood out against this inter-
pretation because it did not square with the Biblical chronology
of the past. Is it fair to treat this as a conflict between scientific
rationality and religious prejudice? Would it not be more just to
say that a widely accepted theory was being ousted by a better
one as new evidence came to light?
The point is that this debate was open and free. The participants
on one side may have been blinkered by their upbringing, but
their beliefs were honestly held and rationally maintained. They
may often have used poor arguments to defend their case-but
they did not call in the secular arm or the secret police. In the
end, they lost; and since then the appeal to Divine Scripture has
ceased to be an acceptable element in a scientific discussion. 61
Taking the last point-that Divine Scripture is not acceptable in
scientific discussion-as definitional, Ziman seems to me to have
matters basically right. There is an important distinction, one that
60 R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM 33 (1982).
61 J. ZIMAN, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE: AN EssAY CONCERNING THE SocIAL DIMEN-
SION OF SCIENCE 21 (1968).
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he seems to appreciate, between saying to the religionist, "Your ar-
gument is out of bounds because it is based on Scripture," and say-
ing, "Your argument doesn't hold up against the evidence, let me
show you why."
A conversation of this kind would at least take religion seriously
as a motive force in tens of millions of lives. I do not suggest that
Ziman's model is the only one that is possible. Robert Audi and
Kent Greenawalt, for example, have struggled to produce theories
that would admit religious convictions into the debate but require
their justification in secular terms.62 I am not sure that these rejus-
tification theories are actually coherent, but if carried to another
step, they might at least point in the right direction. What is needed
is not a requirement that the religiously devout choose a form of
dialogue that liberalism accepts, but that liberalism accept whatever
form of dialogue a member of the public offers. What is needed is a
willingness to listen, not because the speaker has the right voice but
because the speaker has the right to speak. For unless liberal theory
and liberal law develop a way to welcome the religiously devout in
public moral debate without first demanding that they make them-
selves into different people, liberalism will continue its slide from a
pluralistic theory of politics to a narrow, elitist theory of right re-
sults, and damned be those who try to block the liberal path.
• • • • • • •
Well, it's been a long two nights, and I want to thank all of you
for your kind attention. I argued last night that the move toward
what I have called empirical morality has established a constitu-
tionallaw more interested in counting than reasoning, and I tried to
explain why that development ought to be unsettling to those who
prefer their constitutional decisions clear and determinate. In to-
night's lecture, I have tried to explain why the relentlessly material-
ist focus of contemporary liberal constitutionalism necessarily
creates a constitutional law that appears in some ways to denigrate
religious faith.
That last point deserves a few more words, for the danger to lib-
eralism as a political theory is almost palpable. Until the time that
liberalism manages to change itself, I really do fear that the matter
comes down to something like this: if you keep quiet about your
religious belief, practice it privately, treat it, as I have said, like a
62 See K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988);
Audi, The Separation ofChurch and State and the Obligations ofCitizenship, 18 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 259 (1989).
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hobby, well, that's just fine; if you parade your belief, however, if
you make a public show of your devotion, then you are at best a
fool and at worst a hypocrite; and if you act on religious principle,
if you try to build the world that you think your God wants you to,
and if your only reason for doing so is to fulfill the word of God,
well, then you're a fanatic.
I find this a frightening vision of the course of liberalism. A pub-
lic moral dialogue that rules so many opinions out of bounds be-
cause of the way in which they were formed is a dialogue scarcely
worthy of the name. And a liberalism that considers scientific crea-
tionists less like the supporters of the Circular Area Bill than like
the Ayatollah Khomeini is a liberalism that has somewhere along
the line forgotten that its central tenet is not primacy of materialist
science, but primacy of individual conscience.
• • • •
End of Second Lecture
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